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AN ASSESSMENT OF THE UKUSA RELATIONSHIP:  
WHERE WE GO FROM HERE

~~(S-NF)~~ The UKUSA relationship has been of inestimable value to NSA and cannot be abandoned, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] This paper is an honest effort by SUSLO-4 to describe the strengths and weaknesses of the UKUSA relationship so that NSA might better be able to make some hard decisions about the future of the relationship.

~~(TS-NF)~~ There is no doubt that UKUSA offers NSA much. Just to document a few important contributions we must include:

[REDACTED] unique collection from GCHQ conventional sites, freeing US resources; use of UK [REDACTED] where the US has none; [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] the compatibility and interoperability of US & UK SIGINT systems; a strong analytic workforce, with a capability for independent interpretation of events; an especially competent cryptanalytic workforce; savings in US resources by analytic divisions of efforts; the pooling of resources on key technical projects during austere fiscal periods; [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] and, perhaps most important, a record of supporting the US as an ally in confronting world problems.

~~(S-NF)~~ Despite these outstanding areas of success, there

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~~(S NF)~~

[REDACTED]

~~(S NF)~~

[REDACTED]

~~(S NF)~~

[REDACTED]

#### INTERFACES

~~(C NF)~~ NSA and GCHQ interface in a number of ways, to include connection of joint processing systems, communications links of many types, and the exchange of personnel to work in integrated positions. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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~~(S-NF)~~ Communications between NSA and GCHQ run smoothly; both sides meet regularly to plan improved communications of varied kinds. [REDACTED]

~~(S-NF)~~ Aside from the respective liaison staffs, NSA and GCHQ exchange large number of integrees [REDACTED] NSA/CSS personnel at GCHQ; some [REDACTED] GCHQ integrees at NSA). Most integrees work hard at technical skills and contribute greatly to a mutual interchange of ideals and techniques that benefit both side greatly. More so in recent years, some operational and staff elements in GCHQ have begun to use integrees as their representatives, and some integrees have assumed liaison-like functions. Making matters worse has been a recent trend to send integrees to function as special assistants, sometimes to alpha plus-one components working sensitive missions. While they are no doubt of great help to NSA managers, they also serve as lobbyists for GCHQ seniors in policy matters. Recently GCHQ/K1 lobbied hard to place an integree in the G2/SA position. G2 rightly rejected this as it would give GCHQ insight into certain sensitive operations we do not share. In another instance a strategically placed GCHQ integree drafted an MOA that committed [REDACTED] assistance from NSA to GCHQ -- without addressing the correctness of this assistance, the propriety of this situation is disturbing.

~~(S-NF)~~ Whether comms links or exchange of integrees, the mode of interfacing with GCHQ evolves based on a myriad of decisions at various levels within NSA. Do we need to have an overall policy to ensure that these agreements are consistent with our plans for the future? For instance, should we determine a modus vivendi for exchange of integrees? Should the type of work be limited by charter? Should there be a common NSA position on the number and kind of electronic interfaces between NSA and GCHQ? Should the number be driven by NSA design or by GCHQ needs?

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